Posts Tagged ‘India’

Adapting to Insurgent ‘Outsourcing’ in Assam

24 March, 2008

The latest edition of the South Asia Intelligence Review has an interesting piece examining the adaptive use of new strategies and tactics by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in northeast India. The article by Wasbir Hussain – a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board and an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi – also examines the various adjustments in counterinsurgency tactics necessitated by ULFA’s new approach.

The counter-insurgency mechanism in northeastern India’s largest state, Assam, was almost falling into a pattern nearly two decades after it was launched, but drastic shifts in strategy by the highly adaptive United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the state’s frontline separatist group, have compelled the security establishment to carry out a major rejig in operations. In the past, kidnappings, selective killings and direct gun-battles with security forces were among the favourite tactics for terror and fund generation adopted by the ULFA, which was formed in 1979 to fight for the creation of a ‘sovereign, Socialist Assam’. Of late, however, ULFA appears to have adopted a strategy to protect its cadres from the hands of pursuing Army, Police and Paramilitary Forces, by avoiding direct combat with the troopers. There is, as a result, resort to the use of hirelings, who may not even be sympathizers of the group, to carry out bomb and grenade attacks. Security officials in Assam have described this new trend as ‘outsourcing’ by the ULFA, with the objective of inflicting maximum damage with minimum loss to the group itself.

The need to protect its well-trained cadres, and the corresponding adoption of outsourcing, is seen as a consequence of the recent success of both the kinetic and non-kinetic elements of COIN strategy in Assam, which has resulted in large numbers of ULFA cadres being killed or arrested, and equally large numbers responding to state government initiatives and surrendering. In response, ULFA has been forced to adapt, with some of its principal tactical shifts summarised below:

* In the past, the group used to recruit cadres and send them for prolonged military training at their bases in Bhutan, Myanmar or Bangladesh. The long absence of certain youths from a particular village or localities, and their reappearance after a considerable gap, made it easier for the security and intelligence machinery to ascertain if they were ULFA members and to keep tabs on them. However, in the wake of the loss of ULFA’s staging and training facilities in Bhutan, following the Bhutanese military crackdown in December 2003, and the comparatively better cooperation from the military junta in Myanmar, the ULFA is sending fresh cadres for short-term training, mostly within Assam and along the Arunachal Pradesh-Myanmar border.

* This strategy of sending recruits for short training courses has reduced the span of absence from their homes, and has lessened the possibility of suspicion being aroused in the minds of informers or the intelligence community.

* Until 2000, the ULFA was engaged in shootouts with the Security Forces (SFs), but such direct engagement between the rebels and the troopers have now become a rarity. The ULFA clearly finds the costs of direct confrontations disproportionate with any calculable returns.

* The new strategy adopted by the ULFA includes hiring youths, even students, who do not have any criminal records or do not figure in the scan list of the security forces, to lob grenades or plant improvised explosive devices (IED) at public places. These ‘stealth attacks’ constitute a zero risk to the rebel group in terms of potential loss of trained manpower.

The use of untrained ‘contractors’ has had negative consequences for ULFA’s operational effectiveness, however, with several incidents of such recruits being killed or injured while transporting or emplacing IEDs. Poorly executed or carelessly targeted operations have also accelerated the already increasing incidence of random civilian casualties resulting from ULFA operations, which has aroused public hostility against the group. Nevertheless, it has succeeded in its objective of insulating the ULFA hardcore from security force operations. This has forced a similar degree of adaptation on the part of the security forces, with some of the new tactics employed including:

* A close watch on school and college dropouts, after intelligence agencies ascertained that militants had been using such youths to work for them. Profiles of such dropouts or unemployed youth in an area are increasingly being maintained by Police and intelligence agencies.

* An increased focus by enforcement and intelligence agencies on front organizations, sympathizers and facilitators, who may provide the links to approach and hire mercenaries to execute bomb or grenade attacks…

* Pushing ahead with a well coordinated offensive to ‘dislocate’ ULFA cadres from their established camps / strongholds / areas of operation to newer areas. This is aimed at hitting at both the group’s ‘composition’ and ‘disposition’.

* Intelligence agencies say ULFA men have been pushed by military operations to places in Nagaland and East Karbi Anglong, where they have not been able to establish their logistics or local support networks, affecting their ability to strike comfortably.

* Such focused attempts at dislocating ULFA units, according to intelligence agencies, have forced different units of the outfit to come together. This has resulted in some lack of coordination and has affected command structures, because cadres of different units are not used to working together.

* These problems have been compounded further by the fact that ULFA’s bond with the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) is said to have become fragile, of late. According to intelligence agencies, this has compelled the ULFA to look for other locations to set up base, outside of Myanmar, where they had earlier secured safe haven under NSCN-K protection. This dislocation has made them more vulnerable to intensified SF operations.

* ULFA is said to have already set up semi-permanent camps in Arunachal Pradesh. Counter-insurgency forces are focusing their attention on these areas and are putting pressure on New Delhi to remove the ‘lacunae’ in the legal framework that does not allow the Army to move more than 20 kilometres beyond Assam’s borders, into Arunachal Pradesh, in hot pursuit.

In addition, in a bid to exploit mounting public disaffection with ULFA brutality, senior commanders have informed field commanders they will be dealt with severely if their units are guilty of human rights violations or other excesses while conducting COIN operations. Previously there had been several high-profile incidents of the death of suspected militants in custody, and the architects of the new COIN approach are determined such cases will not dilute growing public hostility toward ULFA in the future.

The validity of this posture was tacitly acknowledged by ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa in a 16 March statement in which he stressed that the local population was unhappy with ‘anti-revolutionary activities by revolutionary soldiers,’ adding that ‘the masses would be inspired if we could overcome our frailty and advance with renewed discipline.’

The adoption of outsourcing by ULFA is part of a wider global trend that has been evident in both Afghanistan (where Giustozzi details the use made of outsourcing by the Taliban when establishing itself in new districts), and Iraq (where it has been particularly exploited by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and by agents of Iran). As such, the success or failure of counter-strategies adopted by security forces in Assam are likely to prove instructive for those engaged with similar sub-state militant groups elsewhere.

Read the full text of the Wasbir Hussain article, entitled Assam: Counter-insurgency Rejig, here.

Update:

The above link appears to have expired. A copy of the article is available here.

The Indian Approach to COIN

6 March, 2008

IRG member Chris Butler writes:

“An interesting monograph on COIN from an alternative perspective – the Indian one, lest we focus too much on Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations
by Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army (retired)

The document comes to the following conclusions:

1. Indian approach to COIN has been a mix of political accommodation, economic development and the use of force.

2. Demands for secession or independence from the Union are put down firmly and not accepted. India is willing to wear down the insurgents until this demand is dropped or modified.

3. India is willing to talk to separatist groups and its neighbors even though they support cross border terrorism and insurgency.

4. While India is willing to create new states within the Union to accommodate ethno-nationalist aspirations and tribal boundaries, it is not willing to create additional states based solely on any one religion.

5. India has been very particular not to use indiscriminate force, aerial bombardment and heavy firepower in COIN despite its conventional and nuclear superiority in the region.

6. COIN operations in Kashmir have been very particular to minimize the impact on India’s 140 million moderate Muslims.

7. Despite proof of external support, India has always conducted its COIN within its own borders.

8. India COIN approach follows the strategy of ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove,’ adopting an aggressive military approach towards hard-core insurgents and a humane face towards the local population.

9. India’s COIN approach has been aimed at using the security forces to create conditions for a political solution to restore normalcy in the insurgency affected area.

10. Human rights and weaning the population away from supporting the insurgents is the major plank of India’s COIN operations. To achieve this a multi-dimension approach to include, people-centric civic action programs, economic development, perception management programs, cultivating a responsible media, training of troops for COIN operations, force modernization, good governance, the rule of law, accountability and transparency, diplomatic and international cooperation and support, and a functioning corruption free democracy form parts of the comprehensive Indian approach to COIN operations.

11. India has the capability to stay the course and fight an insurgency in a protracted low intensity conflict to wear down the insurgencies and its supporters however, it prefers to resolve the legitimate grievances and welcome its citizens into the democratic process as quickly as possible.

12. In Kashmir, the Indian approach has been based on three major thrust lines to wean away Kashmiri support to the insurgency and restore normalcy; first, cut off the insurgents from their support base in Pakistan and destroy them within India to provide security to the state, improve the socio-economic structure of the state by increasing development projects, ensuring good governance, and improving the daily life of the people ravaged by decades of insurgency and terrorism, psychological initiatives to win the hearts and minds of the people and initiate a genuine dialogue with all parties to the conflict restore India’s credibility within Kashmir and arrive at a just resolution within the Union.


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